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Within an incomplete contract framework, we analyze the enlargement strategy of a club facing
applicants that di¤er in wealth and reform status. While an applicant bene…ts from entry, the
club only gains if the entrant makes an adjustment investment. The club has a choice between
early admittance, using its limited internal enforcement powers to ensure reform, and late
admittance conditional on prior reform. Wealthy candidates enter early as the club can charge
a higher entrance fee for undiscounted membership bene…ts. For poor applicants, the club
applies a reversed admittance order: A less advanced applicant is admitted early to reform as
member, while a more advanced enters late after it has reformed. Moreover, the admittance
rents increase in the ratio of reform distance to wealth. The viability of the late admittance
strategy depends on the club’s commitment ability. If the club can credibly commit to a stage-
…nancing schedule, it can induce applicants to reform without overfunding. In the repeated
game, the threat of denying additional funding is not credible, and more overfunding is required
for reform.1 Introduction
Much economic activity evolves around clubs (Tiebout (1956), Buchanan (1965)). Owing to
its public choice origins, the club literature has primarily analyzed the level of ’club good’
provision and the equilibrium club size (Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) and Cornes and Sandler
(1996)). To mitigate free riding problems, most clubs are endowed with a monopoly over
the club entrance decision. This paper studies the strategic use of this exclusive right in the
admittance of new members.
More speci…cally, we analyze a club’s decision to admit an applicant whose type is charac-
terized by its wealth and a reform requirement. While the entrant bene…ts from membership,
the club only gains if the entrant reforms. Reform investments are not contractible. The club
has a choice between early, late and no o¤er. This choice matters for an applicant’s incentives
and ability to reform. With early admittance, the club can apply its imperfect internal en-
forcement tools to force the entrant to reform. Under a late o¤er, admittance is conditional
on prior reforms and the future membership bene…ts provide incentives to adopt to the club’s
standard.
Wealthy applicants are willing to pay more for joining the club early rather than late.
Thus, beyond a certain wealth level, the club makes only early o¤ers. Poor applicants are
o¤ered a reversed admittance order: Advanced types enter late only after having reformed,
while less advanced types enter early and reform as new members. The prospect of future
membership bene…ts provides incentives for applicants to reform rather than consume. By
giving the applicant more money, the club raises the incentive to reform with a late o¤er. The
additional funds generate a higher marginal utility if the applicant reforms (when consumption
is lower) than otherwise. The overfunding needed to incduce reform increases with the reform
distance. As a result, the use of leverage from late conditional admittance is a more cost-
e¢cient strategy only for advanced types. For less advanced types, the early o¤er is cheaper
because the club can ensure through its imperfect internal control that at least a portion of the
reform funds is used for reform. Thus, both o¤ers concede rents to the applicants that increase
in the reform distance.
The power of using future membership bene…ts as incentive mechanism, and hence, the
viability of the late admittance strategy depends on the club’s commitment ability. If the club
can commit not to renegotiate a stage-…nancing schedule, it can split the reform requirement
into small steps and reduce the late o¤er transfer to the pure reform …nance. Opportunistic
1behavior in the repeated enlargement game makes an incentive compatible late o¤er more
costly, and the set of late o¤er types shrinks.
A topical application for our framework is the Eastern Enlargement of the EU. Member-
ship applicants from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are severely …nancially constrained,
and attainment of EU standards is often not their optimal development strategy because EU
standards suit a rich group of highly developed countries. The twin roles of …nancier and
enlargement monopolist give the EU strong in‡uence over the reform agenda of applicants.
Unlike Berglöf and Roland (1998), we allow for …nancing of reforms ahead of entry. We assume
that complete contracts with a speci…ed reform level are not possible because either reform is
non-veri…able or there is no enforcement institution with authority over sovereign countries.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the coexistence of direct and intermediated
lending. In moral hazard models of direct and indirect lending (e.g., Diamond 1991, Holmström
and Tirole 1997), there are typically three regimes. Firms with su¢cient wealth can issue direct
debt. Firms with fewer own assets engage in asset substitution, unless they are monitored.
Hence, they can only borrow from banks. Finally, undercapitalized …rms cannot raise outside
…nance. These three outcomes correspond to the late, early, and no admittance o¤er in our
framework where the reform distance can be interpreted as a measure of the moral hazard
problem. Using future membership bene…ts as an incentive mechanism resembles the use of a
liquidation threat or denial of future access to funding as instruments to discipline borrowers in
a setting without collaterals or su¢cient pledgeable returns (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein 1990,
Hart and Moore 1994, Gromb 1994).
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section 2. Section 3 charac-
terizes the enlargement strategy of the club in the one-shot game. In Section 4, we restrict
attention to applicants with zero wealth, and allow for several sequential transfers. We analyze
opportunistic behavior and the role of commitment power with a late conditional o¤er. We
conclude in Section 5. Mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Framework
A club composed of homogeneous members that act as a single player faces an applicant for
membership. The applicant’s type is de…ned by its wealth w ¸ 0 and its reform requirement




2standard xC along some reform dimension x. While x is observable, it is not veri…able.
Reform is modeled as a costly adjustment of the applicant’s initial position towards the
club standard. Our focus is on conformity requirements rather than reforms that raise the
applicant’s welfare directly.
Assumption 1 (Reform) Investment in x yields no direct return to the applicant, but bene…ts
the incumbent members of the enlarged club.
By investing F in reform the applicant moves from x0 to x = x0 +F.1 Feasibility requires
that F · w+s; where s 2 R is the …nancial transfer with an admittance o¤er. We assume that
the club has …nancial slack. If an applicant has insu¢cient funds to meet the club standard,
the club has to provide the necessary funds.2 A positive transfer is a subsidy from the club to
the applicant, while a negative one is an entrance fee the club charges for membership.
Instead of investing into reforms, the applicant may use its resources (w + s ¡ F) for
consumption. The utility function u : R+ ! R+ is twice continuously di¤erentiable with
u(0) = 0; u0 > 0 and u00 < 0:
Besides rejecting an applicant, the club has two enlargement strategies. The club can o¤er
late admittance conditional on prior reform investment. Alternatively, it can o¤er early admit-
tance, where any investment in meeting the club’s standard is undertaken after the applicant
has joined. By joining the club, the entrant becomes subject to club rules and institutions.
Assumption 2 (Internal Control) Under an early admittance o¤er, the club can enforce
the use for reform of a fraction ° 2 (0;1) of an entrant’s post-entry wealth, while it has no
enforcement power over non-members.
Even if the club provides reform funds, the applicant retains full discretion over the use of
its entire resources (w + s) under a late o¤er. In contrast, a newly admitted member controls
only a fraction (1 ¡ °), where ° re‡ects the strength of internal enforcement powers of the club.
We assume that the club uses its enforcement powers to maximize the reform status of the new
member even if full reform is not feasible.
1We assume that an investment in x is inconsequential for the value of the applicant’s outside option. Rather
than analyzing a hold-up problem arising from investment ideosyncracy, we focus in the following on the use of
leverage from a late conditional entry o¤er for setting reform incentives.
2The applicant has no projects that generate returns it could pledge to outsiders. Hence, the club is the
sole potential lender. Note, however, that outside lenders could provide an incentive compatible transfer s.
(Independent of the source of s; the club gladly accepts new members whose reform investments it did not have
to fund.) While s does not have to be provided by the club, outsiders do not get the enlargement gain ¦
R and
hence, have no incentives to provide reform …nance.
3The club, i.e., its current members realizes an enlargement gain ¦R from a fully adjusted
new member, while it gets ¦U < 0 < ¦R if the new member fails to meet the standard. In order
to focus on the link between admittance and reform, we exclude that the club can pro…tably
sell membership irrespective of reform.
Assumption 3 (Unreformed Entry) ¦U + u¡1(¼) < 0:
The expression u¡1(¼) is the most the club can extract from an applicant when admittance
does not lead to reform. Hence, for ¦U +u¡1(¼) < 0 the club strictly prefers no o¤er to a non-
reform implementing o¤er (see Lemma 15). Henceforth, unless explicitly stated, we abstract
from o¤ers that do not induce reform. Membership yields a bene…t ¼ to the applicant regardless
of x; i.e., its degree of conformity with the club standard. While all parameters and variables
are observable, only the receipts of payments and the entry into the club are veri…able. Hence,
contracts on payo¤s (¼ and ¦R) or reform (x) are not enforceable and a conditional late entry
o¤er must instead be self-enforcing.3 Furthermore, the applicant’s payo¤ function is additively
separable in the membership bene…t ¼ and the utility u(¢) from consumption.
All decisions in the game are taken in a single period, referring to reform time rather than
real time. At date 0, the club makes an admittance o¤er to the applicant. More precisely, the
club chooses the triple (x;s;j) where x · xC is the reform requirement, s 2 R is the …nancial
transfer, and j = L;E;N is the timing of enlargement (late, early, and no o¤er). Then
the applicant either accepts or rejects the o¤er. If no entry was o¤ered, or if the applicant
rejects an o¤er, the game ends and both players get the reservation payo¤s normalized to zero.
Upon acceptance, the amount s is transacted and the applicant decides on the levels of reform
investment and consumption. At date 1, x realizes and the late conditional contract is executed.
Figure 1 shows the timing of moves. There is a common discount factor ± < 1. Hence, the date
0 value of the late enlargement bene…ts is ±¼ and ±¦k; k = U;R: For simplicity, the di¤erence
to the club between late entry and initially unreformed early entry with subsequent reform is
negligible. Hence, the payo¤ to the club from early entry is ±¦R if the new member reaches
xC by date 1; but ¦U otherwise.
3If ¼ were veri…able, the club could contractually impose a penalty (withholding ¼) on elarly entrants failing
to reform. As a result, reform could be implemented at a cost equal to the actual reform requirement, and early
o¤ers would weakly dominate late ones.
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Figure 1: Timing
2.2 Discussion
Assumption 1 is motivated by the observation that many club standards are arbitrary or
historically determined rather than inherently optimal, except that members adhere to them.
For instance, when the Channel Tunnel project provided for a railway connection between the
UK and continental Europe, England faced the pure adjustment cost of altering its railway
track width. Our focus is on such conformity requirements rather than reforms that raise the
applicant’s welfare directly. That is, investing in the club standard constitutes a deviation from
the applicant’s optimal stand-alone resource allocation or development path.
At the point of joining, entrants typically submit to explicit and implicit club rules, sur-
rendering some of their discretionary powers. Enforcement institutions may be formal, such as
the European Court of Justice, or the arbitration mechanism of the WTO. Informal disciplin-
ing tools include the threat of expulsion, peer pressure, and discriminatory treatment in other
aspects of club membership.
The club’s enlargement payo¤s ¦U < 0 < ¦R are meant to re‡ect in a simple way that
heterogeneity introduces frictions and inhibits decision making, and hence, is costly to the club.
In the EU example, enlarging the membership list from 15 to over 20 requires reform of the
unanimity decision culture that has evolved over the initial decades of the EC under smaller
membership numbers. Heterogeneity in income, objectives and institutions makes collective
action more di¢cult to coordinate. Furthermore, the more diverging standards are, the smaller
the gains from trade among the club members.
The entrant’s membership bene…ts ¼ are assumed to be independent of his reform status
5and predetermined. Making ¼ sensitive to reform investments would move us away from the
public good notion of the value of a club. Obviously, if bene…ts are sensitive to reform, the
moral hazard problem is mitigated. The bene…ts ¼ being a variable over which the club has no
discretion captures the notion that they are predetermined by applying the current club rules
to the newly admitted member. For example, the EU faces high (possibly prohibitive) costs
of altering the sections of the acquis communautaire that detail the agricultural and regional
support funds for which new members qualify. In addition, we assume that club rules prohibit
exclusion from the club after entry, and that the rules can only be changed by a unanimous
vote of all members. Hence, the club cannot use the threat of exclusion in the early entry case
to induce the entrant not to consume the resources under its discretion.
There are three possible interpretations for the additively separable payo¤ function of the
applicant. First, the applicant is a single agent and the private bene…t ¼ is non-monetary and
non-transferable. Second, the applicant consists of a large group of individuals and the member-
ship bene…ts accrue to a di¤erent set than the utility from consumption. Third, with veri…able
bene…ts, club rules may exclude the withholding of membership bene…ts in response to insuf-
…cient reform. For instance, the EU could not coerce Greece into implementing environmental
safety measures with the threat of withholding Structural Funds or CAP payments. (Similarly,
it is generally not possible for a state to reduce a convict’s pension claim as punishment.)
3 The Optimal Admittance Strategy
We solve for the optimal admittance strategy by backwards induction. First, we derive the
minimum necessary transfer s to implement reform, given that the applicant has accepted an
early or late o¤er. Second, we solve for the minimum necessary transfer such that an applicant
accepts an early or a conditional late o¤er, given that full reform is subsequently implemented.
Finally, we compare the cost of inducing any applicant type to accept an early or late o¤er and
to reform. Bearing in mind that the club can also refrain from making an o¤er, the optimal
admittance strategy obtains as a function of the applicant type.
The club maximizes ±¦R ¡ s by choosing a reform threshold x, a transfer s 2 R, and the
type of o¤er j = fE;L;Ng, subject to the applicant’s optimal response.4 At date 1, x realizes
as a function of the reform investment. The decisions left to the club depend on whether it has
made an early or late admittance o¤er at date 0: In the case of an early o¤er, the applicant has
4In fact, the club’s payo¤ range includes ¦
U ¡ s. By Assumption 3, unreformed entry is strictly dominated,
and we restrict the analysis here to reformed entry. The case of unreformed entry is addressed in Appendix H.
6already been admitted and ±¦R materializes mechanically. For x = xC; the date 0 value of the
enlargement is ±¦R ¡s and ¦U ¡s otherwise. The entrant gets ¼+u(w +s ¡F) independent
of x. In case of a late o¤er, the club has to take the …nal admittance decision. The date 0
value of the enlargement payo¤ to the club is ±¦R ¡ s if x = xC and ±¦U ¡ s otherwise. If
the club refuses admittance, its payo¤ is ¡s. Because the players cannot contract upon x; the
admittance o¤er needs to be self-enforcing, i.e., subgame perfect. Hence, the club admits the
applicant if x = xC and rejects it otherwise. For the time being, we assume that the club has
set x = xC and show later that it does indeed do so. Given this admittance rule, the applicant
gets a payo¤ with a date 0 value of ±¼ +u(w + s¡ F) if x ¸ x, and u(w + s¡ F) otherwise.




denote the distance between the applicant’s initial position and the club’s
reform requirement. The club gains from enlargement if the applicant or newly admitted
member fully reforms, i.e., if x = x = xC.
Lemma 1 (Reform Implementation) Under both early and late admittance, full reform
can be implemented for any type (d;w):





(ii) In a late admittance o¤er, the mimimum necessary transfer is
sL0 =
½
d ¡ w if d < ^ d;
^ s(d;w) otherwise,
where ^ d = u¡1(±¼) and ^ s(d;w) solves ±¼ + u(w + s¡ d) = u(w +s): Furthermore, ^ d is
increasing and ^ s decreasing in ±:
In the case of early admittance, the entrant already enjoys the membership bene…ts and
has no incentive to reform. Instead, it spends all its discretionary resources (1 ¡°)(w +s) on
consumption. Depending exclusively on the club’s limited internal enforcement, full reform is
feasible only if the entrant’s total resources after entry are no less than d
°. Hence, the club has
to set s such that °(w +s) ¸ d. While the club can induce reform for any early entrant, the
cost d
° ¡ w becomes prohibitive for su¢ciently unreformed types. The borderline above which





In the case of late admittance, investment in F is of value to the applicant only if it leads to
entry, but comes at the opportunity cost of forgone consumption. Hence, the applicant either
7does not reform (F = 0) or invests exactly the amount needed to meet the entry condition
(F = d). For full reform to be feasible, the club must leave the applicant at least s = d ¡ w.
Having the necessary funds at their disposal, only the most advanced applicant types (d · ^ d)
reform fully. For all other types (d > ^ d), the utility from diverting d ¡ w exceeds the future
membership bene…ts. Nonetheless, the club can induce these types to reform by giving them
a larger amount. Such overfunding renders reform incentive compatible, because the marginal
utility of consuming w + s ¡ d is larger when d is invested in reforms than when the entire
w+s is used for consumption. The minimum late o¤er transfer that provides reform incentives
is ^ s. This transfer increases in d but decreases in ±.5 A larger d raises the opportunity
cost of reform, while a larger ± raises the bene…t of reform. Finally, for every wealth level,
there is a critical reform distance d above which the late o¤er ceases to be pro…table for the
club. The borderline is given by ±¦R = ^ s, which de…nes an increasing and concave curve








The club’s optimal admittance strategy does not follow directly from the lowest imple-
mentation cost of reform. In addition, an applicant must also accept an early or a late o¤er.
The minimum necessary transfer that is both accepted and implements reform obtains from
comparing implementation and individual rationality constraints in each case.














Figure 2 shows how the applicant types are separated according to the binding constraint.
In Region I; applicants are poor relative to their distance to the club standard. Therefore,
the club has to leave the applicant su¢cient funds. That is, the binding FC-E determines sE:
Applicants in Region II are relatively wealthy, and the entrance fee is constrained by their
outside option of not joining, u(w): All types for which the FC-E and the IR-E simultaneously
bind constitute the curve
¡
IRE ¡FCE¢
; separating Regions I and II. Finally, for any given
w; types from Region I require a larger s than those from II:6
5Total di¤erentiation of the late o¤er transfer s = d ¡ w + u











0 (w + s ¡ d)
u0 (w + s ¡ d) ¡ u0 (w + s)
> 0:
by concavity of u. In general, the curvature of s
L in d is ambiguous. (We discuss this issue in Appendix I.)







° d is the minimum retained after reforming. Manipulation
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      u
-1(„ )
Figure 2: Acceptance Of An Early O¤er






^ s if d > u¡1 (±¼) and d > w ¡u¡1 [u(w) ¡ ±¼];
d ¡ w + u¡1 [u(w) ¡ ±¼] if d > u¡1 (±¼) and d · w ¡u¡1 [u(w) ¡ ±¼];
d ¡ w if d · u¡1(±¼) and w < u¡1(±¼);
d ¡ w + u¡1 [u(w) ¡ ±¼] if d · u¡1 (±¼) and w ¸ u¡1 (±¼):
Figure 3 illustrates the binding constraint and consequent transfers for each applicant type.
Region I contains applicant types that are relatively poor and have a large reform requirement.
For those types, the incentive constraint IC-L binds. The types in Regions II and IV are rich
relative to their reform distance, and the minimum accepted transfer is determined by their
outside option u(w): That is, the individual rationality constraint IR-L binds. The dividing
line between Regions I and II;
¡
IRL ¡ ICL¢
is given by the points where the IC-L and the IR-L
simultaneously bind. This implies that the transfer is zero on this curve. Applicants in Region
III are relatively poor, and the membership bene…t outweighs the utility from consumption.
Subsidized types (d > w) do not divert any resources, while types with d < w are willing to
pay an entrance fee. Thus, the minimum accepted transfer is determined by the feasibility
yields
d
° ¡ w ¸ d ¡ w + u
¡1 [u(w) ¡ ¼]:
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Figure 3: Acceptance Of A Late O¤er
constraint FC-L. For any given w; types from Region I require the largest s.7
In addition to the transfer s and the timing of admittance, an o¤er made in the beginning
of the period speci…es a threshold x. Setting ¹ x = xC is immediate. In a late o¤er, the club will
admit an applicant at date 1 only if x = xC. Hence, a choice ¹ x < xC is not time consistent and
will simply be ignored by the club at the time of the …nal admission decision. In an accepted
early o¤er, F = d · ° (w + s) by Lemma 2. That is, the reform investment comes from the
club controlled fraction of w + s and the choice of ¹ x is inconsequential. Thus, in either o¤er
it is a weakly dominant strategy for the club to set ¹ x = xC. While this threshold is implicitly
understood by a rational applicant, we assume nonetheless that the club formally announces
it.
The above analysis allows us to classify the applicant types into recipients of early, late,
and no o¤er. To obtain an unambiguous classi…cation, we make a further assumption.











u0[(1¡°)x] > 1 ¡°; 8x ¸ 0:
7For the types in Region I;























For a given w; this is greater than d¡ w +u
¡1 [u(w) ¡ ±¼]; the transfer for types from Regions II and IV: For
types from Region I; u(w + s) ¡ ±¼ > 0 implies that the transfer to types in III (d ¡ w) is also less.
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Figure 4: The Optimal O¤er
Part (i) of Assumption 4 ensures that the least pro…table type to get an admittance o¤er
receives an early one. Part (ii) implies that the set of types for which late is the preferred
o¤er is connected.8 After presenting our results, we discuss the robustness with respect to this
assumption. De…ne w1 ´ u¡1(±¼) and w2 : ±¼ +u[(1 ¡°)w] = u(w):
Proposition 1 Only types with w > d
° ¡±¦R receive an admittance o¤er. Among these types,
(i) for d · w1; the club follows a ’reversed’ admittance order;
(ii) for w1 < w · w2; the club o¤ers early entry to the most advanced types, and follows a
reversed admittance order otherwise;
(iii) for w > w2; the club o¤ers only early entry.
Figure 4 illustrates the Proposition. On the one hand, entering early rather than late is of
value due to discounting. For rich applicants, the marginal utility of wealth is su¢ciently low
that they are willing to pay a higher price to gain entry early. For rich types, this discount
e¤ect dominates. On the other hand, poor types receive reform funding from the club. They
have a high marginal utility of wealth and hence, a strong temptation to consume the funds.
8For example, u(¢) =
p
¢ satis…es Part (ii):
u
0 (x)
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1¡° > 1 ¡ °: The negative
exponential function u(¢) = ¡e
¡x does not satisfy Part (ii).
11An incentive compatible late o¤er is then more expensive for the club than using its imperfect
internal enforcement technology to get reforms implemented. For an intermediate range of
wealth relative to reform distance, the cheapest way to induce the applicant to reform is the
use of leverage from conditioning entry on prior full reform. In this range, where both d and
w are not too large, neither the wealth e¤ect nor the overfunding e¤ect are su¢ciently strong
to dominate the leverage e¤ect.
For any given wealth level, types with too large reform distance do not receive an admittance
o¤er. From a social e¢ciency perspective, too few types receive o¤ers. The socially e¢cient
cut-o¤ rule for the early o¤er is ¼ + ±¦R ¡ d = 0, while the club applies ±¦R ¡ s = 0; where
s ¸ d.
Our notion of reversed order of admission refers to ’reform time’ (not calendar time). More
advanced types, i.e., low d values, are admitted after they have reformed, while less advanced
enter prior to reforming. Thus, the enlargement strategy applies “double standards”. Unlike
more backward candidates, stronger candidates are asked to prove their willingness to conform
with the club standard.9
Corollary 1 Among the entrants, wealthy types pay an entrance fee in addition to the full
reform cost, intermediate types pay part of their reform cost, while poor types receive a rent in
addition to their reform cost.
Corollary 1 is illustrated in Figure 5. In Region I, applicants are so poor relative to their
reform distance that the club must provide more than the pure reform …nance; under the late
o¤er, such overfunding is necessary to meet the incentive constraint, while under the early o¤er
the club is unable to control all of the new member’s reform funds. In Region II; the club
and the applicant share the reform costs, while in Region III the applicants are so wealthy
and pay not only the full reform cost but in addition an entrance fee. The rent that the least
advanced types earn under both early and late o¤ers (from imperfect internal control over
reform funds and from the reform incentive scheme, respectively) rise in the reform distance
d, making reformed entry eventually prohibitively expensive for the club. Thus, the transfer
decreases in the ratio of wealth to reform distance.
9Our reversed admittance order appears to contradict the common intuition that a club should pick the most
advanced applicants for the nearest enlargement. The contradiction resolves if one considers a whole reform
period an ’enlargement occasion’. The club then picks indeed the most advanced applicants for the occasion,
but over the reform period applies the reversed admittance order.
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Figure 5: Transfer Payments With The Optimal O¤er
Corollary 2 (i) An increase in ° enlarges the set of early o¤er canditates, and weakly reduces
the transfer to all candidates that previously received an o¤er.
(ii) An increase in ± or ¼ enlarges the set of late o¤er candidates, and weakly decreases the
transfer to all candidates. In addition, an increase in ± also strictly enlarges the set of types
receiving an o¤er.
Stronger internal enforcement (an increase in °) makes the early o¤er cheaper for the club
and turns some previous recipients of late or no o¤ers into early o¤er types. The transfer sE
falls in those regions where the FC-E is the binding constraint; for wealthy applicants, the FC-E
is slack and the IR-E binds, and hence, their entrance fee is unchanged. A rise in the discount
factor makes late entry worth more and hence, increases reform incentives. Furthermore, it
relaxes the IR-L. Accordingly, the club substitutes late for early o¤ers for some candidates. It
also shifts dNE upwards, and hence, early o¤ers are made to some former no-o¤er types. A
larger ¼ raises the relative attractiveness of the late o¤er, because it relaxes the IC-L while the
FC-E is una¤ected. Although it also relaxes the IR-E, the boundaries between early and late
o¤er lie strictly in the set of types where the FC-E determines sE. Hence, while a larger ¼
lowers s where the IR-E binds, it does not change the type of o¤er.
13Proposition 1 crucially depends on Assumption 4. While the discounting e¤ect underlying
the assignment of early o¤ers to wealthy types only requires concavity, the reversed admittance
result for poorer types depends on the degree of curvature of u. More precisely, the late
o¤er transfer sL for candidates d < u¡1(±¼) is determined by the FC-L constraint and hence
independent of u: Above the horizontal line dJ, however, early o¤ers become cheaper beyond
by virtue of Assumption 4. This assumption ensures that sL increases at a faster rate than °;
the rate at which sE increases. Alternatively, the ’reversed’ admittance result also obtains with
the restriction that the function u belongs to the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA)
family that satisfy DARA. Such functions imply that sL is convex in d (Appendix I). If
neither Assumption 4 nor DARA-HARA holds, sL may be concave in d for any given w: In
this case it is no longer guaranteed that sL eventually exceeds the cost under the early o¤er
sE: As a result, reversed admittance may not obtain, as there may not be a set of types with
w < w1 where an early o¤er is the optimal choice of the club. Alternatively, the concave sL
may intersect sE twice, generating either the reversed admittance pattern, or a pattern late-
early-late, depending on whether the second intersection lies above or below dNE. Crucial and
common to both sets of assumptions (Assumption 4 and DARA-HARA) is that sL increases
by more than sE: This qualitative feature is most easily achieved by assuming absolute club
enforcement power established by incurring a …xed cost. In this case, the requirements for the
reversed admittance result reduce to simple concavity of u.10
4 Commitment And The Viability Of Late O¤ers
In the framework of Section 3, there is but an endgame and potential commitment problems
do not arise. For instance, if an applicant diverts all funds, the game ends before it has
the opportunity to ask for more funding. Once two or more reform periods are considered,
commitment a¤ects the viability of the late o¤er, while there is no room for opportunistic
behavior in case of an early o¤er. To analyze the role of commitment in the use of leverage for
setting reform incentives, we focus on the subset of relatively poor applicants where the moral
hazard problem is not dominated by the discount e¤ect.
Assumption 5 (Zero Wealth) All applicant types have zero wealth.
10Note the importance of the concavity of u: With a linear felicity function, the marginal utility of consumption
is a constant across states. Setting for illustration the marginal utility of consumption equal to one, the incentive
constraint for reform under a late o¤er is ±¼ + ^ s = d+ ^ s: Hence, the club cannot lessen the applicant’s incentive
to consume the reform funds by providing ex ante overfunding. In that case, d
LE = ^ d; and late entry is only
dominant for d · ^ d:
14While we restrict the analysis for simplicity to zero wealth applicants, the results results in
this section apply qualitatively also to positive wealth levels below w1:11
On the one hand, late o¤ers are strictly dominant and sL = d if the club can fully commit
not to renegotiate a stage-…nancing schedule. On the other hand, in a multi-period setting
where the club cannot commit not to renew funding, the set of late o¤er types gradually
shrinks as the number of periods increases. The applicant can exploit this lack of commitment
in two ways. Having received reform …nance from the club, the applicant can deviate from the
reform path by consuming the funds directly and returning next period for renewed funding.
Alternatively, it can spend all or part to lower its reform status in order to extract larger rents
in coming periods because of its larger reform distance. We also show that the club will renege
on its promise to reward an applicant for having fully reformed. This commitment problem
prevents the club from implementing the late admittance strategy in the cheapest incentive
compatible way.
4.1 Stage-Financing
In the previous section, the club was restricted to making a single payment in the beginning
of the (reform) period. We now assume that the club can split both funding and reform
requirement into slices and condition the transfer of any subsequent slice upon previous reform.
The following two assumptions ensure that the club can make a credible threat to refuse future
funding.
Assumption 6 (Completion date) The club can commit to a completion date by which an
applicant, holding a late o¤er, must meet the club requirement in order to get admitted.
Assumption 7 (Reform time) Changing the reform status by ¢x requires time L(¢x). For
simplicity, L(¢x) = ¢x.
Under Assumptions 6 and 7, an applicant cannot count on an extension and hence, failure
to reform at any stage renders full reform impossible. Thus, the club will not disburse further
funds. Furthermore, given Assumption 7, the applicant cannot accelerate the reform process.
Hence, it cannot compensate for times without reform investments by compressing more in-
vestments into an arbitrarily short period later. Since L = d, the minimum length of a full
reform period di¤ers among applicant types, the more advanced being able to reach the club
11Due to Assumption 5 (w = 0), acceptance is weakly dominant for those types as the IC-L is slack.
15standard faster. Of course, an applicant may prolong the reform process by spending time
without reforming. Denote by L ¸ L the length of the whole reform period until an applicant
i, holding a late o¤er, reaches the club standard and is admitted. Accordingly, the discount
factor is ± = e¡rL; where r is the rate of time preference. First, we restrict attention to the
class of stage-…nancing o¤ers that implement full reform in the shortest time feasible L = d
(fast reform schedule). Second, we prove that the fastest reform schedule is feasible and that
it dominates all other schedules.
The club splits the reform period into A 2 N+ stages. Each stage a 2 [1;A] lasts la and is
funded with sa. The fast reform schedule without overfunding is given by la = da, sa = da if
the applicant has invested Fa¡1 for a > 1. (Obviously, d1 is unconditional.)
Since e¡rd¼ > u(di) for all d < ^ d (Section 3), it follows that disbursing all the reform
funds up-front is incentive compatible only for the most advanced applicants (d · ^ d). All other
candidates would divert funds if they were paid out up-front. Consider an applicant with a
remaining distance e d to the club standard and discretion over an amount of money m. The
applicant invests m in reforms if e¡r e d¼ ¸ u(m).





The amount m decreases with the remaining distance e d.
A shorter distance e d increases the opportunity costs of diverting the funds now, because the
membership bene…ts accrue sooner. Hence, the incentive compatible amount of reform …nance
rises monotonically the closer the applicant’s ongoing reform take it to the entry threshold. A
closer ’carrot’ ¼ exercises increased leverage on an impatient applicant. Because an applicant
has to reform without any interruption under the fast reform schedule, Lemma 4 also determines
the maximum interval between two consecutive disbursements of funds, and hence, a lower
bound on the number of stages. Furthermore, continuous reform necessitates that the reform
requirement equals the length of each stage, la = da. Recall that for the most advanced
applicant types (d · ^ d), full reform without overfunding can be implemented using a single
disbursement of di. That is, there is no need for stage-…nancing. For less advanced applicant
types d > ^ d, splitting the disbursement of d into stages eliminates the need to o¤er rents. The
inverse relationship between m and e d implies that the maximum interval between subsequent
disbursements increases with the applicant’s reform status. Hence, the maximum length of









16Lemma 5 For an applicant of type d, implementation of full reform without overfunding re-
quires at least A stages where
A¡1 X
a=1




The stage length is chosen so small that the temptation to deviate reform funds at the stage
is less than the cost of not joining the club. While the club can trivially construct any number
of incentive compatible o¤ers without overfunding by splitting stages up further, no smaller
number can be incentive compatible. A smaller number would imply larger reform and funding
requirements per stage, violating the incentive constraint in at least one stage of the o¤er. The
initial reform status x0 and the minimum number of stages are inversely related. In particular,
if the club selects the maximum incentive compatible stage length for all following stages from
the beginning, there is a scheme where the earliest stages are added to an otherwise unmodi…ed
stage-…nancing scheme of a more advanced type.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 6 and 7, full reform can be implemented with no over-
funding for all types. The optimal stage-…nancing schedule is the fast schedule with continuous
funding (A = 1).
The Proposition follows by combining the results of Lemmas 4 and 5 and noting that the
club always prefers increasing the number of stages because it delays disbursement of further
funds. Since at each stage, a reform d ¸ ^ d > 0 is incentive compatible, Proposition 2 implies
that within a …nite minimum number of stages full reform is incentive compatible for any type
without overfunding. Since the enlargement gains accrue only after reform, both the club and
the applicant strictly prefer the fast schedule.12 Under the early o¤er, the entrant retains rents
1¡°
° d > 0; and hence, early entry is strictly dominated.
Under Assumptions 6 and 7, stage-…nancing indeed reduces the cost of enlargement to the
club to funding the pure reform expense. However, both assumptions are crucial for a successful
stage-…nancing approach, and they are not in general satis…ed. First, the club must be able
to commit not to re…nance (and grant an extension) at the end of the reform period. Second,
it must not be possible for the applicant to ’accelerate’ reforms, i.e., compressing full reform
into one single stage. This assumption is needed to exclude opportunistic behavior that does
12The club can implement full reform without leaving the applicant rents using any stage-…nancing schedule
with L > d with a su¢cient number of stages. Consider a schedule where the club grants the applicant reform
time L = L+¢: Trivially, full reform can still be implemented by allocating the entire delay ¢ in an additional,
pure delay stage of length ¢ and with d
1 = s
1 = 0 at the start of the schedule. Having delays at some later
time may require more than one additional stage.
17not require going beyond the end date. Without Assumption 7, re…nancing the full reform
requirement at the beginning of the last stage would be optimal for the club. The anticipation
of renewed …nance in turn discourages reform of the applicant in all earlier stages. Hence, the
viability of a stage-…nancing contract depends on the club’s commitment power not to grant




In the repeated game, the applicant can behave opportunistically in two ways. First, under
a late o¤er it can consume all funds it receives at the beginning of the period and return for
renewedfunding in the next period. In contrast to the one-periodmodel, inallperiods preceding
the endgame, the club cannot credibly commit not to fund again. Second, the applicant can
modify its starting position x0 strategically for a future enlargement situation. Since its rents
rise in d, an applicant has an incentive to lower its position along dimension x in order to
extract more money from the club with a renewed o¤er. Either type of opportunistic behavior
has the e¤ect of shrinking the set of applicant types for which a late admittance o¤er is used
in early periods.
4.2.1 Strategic Consumption
As a simple illustration of the consequences of opportunistic behavior in the repeated game,
consider …rst a once-repeated enlargement game of Section 2 under Assumption 5 (zero wealth).
The …rst round covers dates 0 and 1; and the second dates 1 and 2.13 The optimal late o¤er
in the last period corresponds to the solution of the one-period model (Section 3). Hence,
for d > u¡1(±¼) we have ^ s from Lemma 1 as the optimal transfer. At date 0; the incentive
constraint for reform is
±¼ +u(s0) ¸ u(s0 + d) + ±[±¼ + u(s1)]; (2)
where equality de…nes s0 ´ ^ s0: Suppose ^ s0 = ^ s1 ´ ^ s: Substituting the de…nition of ^ s,
±¼ + u(^ s) = u(^ s+ d) yields 0 ¸ ± [±¼ +u(^ s1)]: Since ¼ > 0 and ^ s1 = ^ s ¸ 0; this cannot be
satis…ed for any ± > 0. Hence, ^ s0 must exceed ^ s1:
13Notice the timing structure: Since no reform takes place between the realization of x at the end of the …rst
round and the issuing of an o¤er in the beginning of the next round, both take place sequentially at date 1:
18The incentive constraint for T = 2, equation (2), generalizes immediately to any 2 < T < 1:
u(^ s0) ¡u(^ s0 +d) = ¡±¼ +
T¡1 X
t=0
±t+1u(^ st+1 +d): (3)
Lemma 6 In the T < 1 times repeated enlargement game, the incentive compatible transfer
with a late o¤er strictly increases in T: Formally, 8t 2 (0;T ¡1); ^ st > ^ st+1: Furthermore,
d(^ st¡^ st+1)
dT < 0:
The opportunity for the applicant to behave opportunistically in the beginning of the re-
peated game imposes a cost on the club that increases with the remaining length of the game.
Thus, the cut-o¤ between late and early admittance o¤ers declines. Furthermore, the level ^ d
below which the late o¤er does not leave any rents to an applicant falls and reaches zero within
a …nite number of periods.
For simplicity, the e¤ect of discounting on overfunding is discussed with reference to T = 2:




(1 ¡ 2±)¼ ¡ u(^ s1) +±u0 (^ s1) ¼
u0(^ s1¡d)¡u0(^ s1)
u0 (s0 +d) ¡u0 (s0)
: (4)
Expression (4) is of ambiguous sign. At high values of ±; the applicant is patient and tries
to maximize the total consumption regardless of when it happens. With larger discounting
current consumption is more valuable, while any delay is costlier. Equation (2) implies
0 ¸ [u(s0 +d) ¡u(s0)] + ±u(^ s1) ¡(1¡ ±)±¼: (5)
The right-hand side consists of the opportunity cost of reforming in period 1; the second is
the bene…t of waiting for next period’s transfer, and the third the cost of delaying entry. The
…rst term weighs relatively most when ± = 0; the second when ± = 1; and the third when ± = 1
2:
For extreme values of ±; the incentive constraint cannot hold (unlike the one-shot enlargement
game where any reform can be made incentive compatible via a su¢ciently large overfunding).
For intermediate values of ±; the transfer ^ s1 may rise or fall in ±:
In the beginning, the club has three enlargement strategies; that is j = L in period 0; or in
1; and j = E in period 0: Clearly, a pro…table early o¤er at date 0 strictly dominates one at
date 1 for any ± < 1: First, consider the choice of o¤ering late admission in period 0 versus 1:
The former is more pro…table if
±¦R ¡ ^ s0 ¡d ¸ ±2¦R ¡± (^ s1 +d)




+ ±^ s1: (6)
19The right-hand side is the sum of the cost to the club of delaying (1 ¡ ±) the enlargement




; and the present value of the future
transfer. The club is the more inclined to pay for present entry the more costly delay is, and
the more future entry will cost. As a result of the commitment problem making late o¤ers more
expensive in the repeated game, substituting early admittance in the …rst round for either late
o¤er is more attractive than in the one-shot game.
Corollary 3 The threshold between early and late o¤ers, dLE
t ; weakly decreases in the number
of periods remaining.14
Consider now the in…nitely repeated enlargement game. The incentive constraint in any
period t is




Only a constant value of st = s¤; 8t; can be a solution. Any increasing or decreasing path
would violate the players’ budget constraints (…nite resources as constraint on club spending).
Hence, in equilibrium we have







¡ u(s¤ ¡ d): (8)
This condition de…nes the minimum incentive compatible level of overfunding with in…nitely
many periods remaining.15 Clearly, ds¤
d¼ < 0 and ds¤
dd > 0: We apply the implicit function




u(s¤ ¡d) +¼(2± ¡1)
u0 (s¤) ¡(1 ¡±)u0 (s¤ ¡ d)
: (9)
This expression is of ambiguous sign. For ± su¢ciently close to 1 the derivative is negative,
but for small ± the denominator is negative and the numerator ambiguous. The ambiguity
14Corollary 3 is a weak rather than strict statement because the cuto¤ d
LE
t is truncated below by 0.
15If the club membership bene…ts accrue in every period of membership rather than only once, the constraint









However, for all d > ^ d; s
¤ > 0; and hence, the commitment problem remains strictly costly for the club.
16With per-period bene…ts the expression takes a simpler form. After substituting for ¼ from the incentive




d± > 0 if and only if u0 (s¤) ¡
(1 ¡ ±)u
0 (s
¤ ¡ d) > 0: Clearly this can only hold for su¢ciently large ±:
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Figure 6: Strategic Deterioration
derives from the presence of two opposing e¤ects that discounting has on the incentive to
reform. On the one hand, impatience lowers the value of the consumption stream derived from
not reforming (
u(s¤+d)
1¡± falls). On the other hand, impatience also means that the discounted
membership gain, i.e., the incentive to reform, is valued less. The two e¤ects are of changing
relative strength because the former is non-linear (
u(s¤+d)
1¡± becomes arbitrarily large as ± rises)
and the latter linear.
Hence, in the repeated game, the late admittance strategy becomes relatively less attractive,
either because entry may be delayed (in the …nitely repeated game), or because it involves larger
rents for the applicant.17 Thus, the range of applicant types for which late entry is the cheaper
strategy shrinks (dLE decreases).
4.2.2 Strategic Deterioration
Consider again the once repeated enlargement game. Instead of consuming the reform funds,
an appliant can use the funds to divest, i.e., deteriorate its starting position from x0 to x0¡F.
The incentive to do so stems from the fact that the rents to the applicant are increasing in d:
This additional possibility to extract rents from the club aggravates the opportunistic behavior
problem.
The gain from investing in strategic deterioration of x is shown in Figure 6. For d < ^ d
the applicant retains no rents in the late conditional o¤er, while for ^ d < d < dJ; it receives
rents (Proposition 1). For dJ < d < dNE; the rents are given by
1¡°
° d under an early o¤er.
The cost of strategic deterioration is given by the 450 line. The applicant engages in strategic
17Farell and Maskin (1989) show that renegotioation proof threats can be constructed in repeated prisoner’s
dilemma games. This threat involves zero rents for the punishing player. In our case, since the club can pro…tably
employ the early entry o¤er, this credible threat strategy with a late o¤er is strictly dominated.
21deterioration if the gain R(d) net of the cost of deterioration yields a higher utility increase
than the discounting cost of delaying membership.
If the applicant has an incentive to use reform …nance to increase the reform distance, it
is a strictly dominant strategy for the club to defer a late o¤er. Hence, the club’s action in
the …rst period is determined by a comparison between an early o¤er now and a late o¤er next
period. This comparison yields a strictly lower level of dJ; the cut-o¤ level of reform distance
above which the club makes an early o¤er, and below which it makes a late o¤er in the next
period. Discounting lowers the club’s payo¤ from this deferred late o¤er and hence, dJ is lower
now.
If the number of future periods rises, the late o¤er is deferred until the last period. Hence,
it gets more discounted, and the threshold between a deferred late o¤er, and an early one now,
shifts down.
Corollary 4 If the applicant has an incentive to strategically deteriorate, as T ! 1; dLE
t ! 0
and the only o¤ers made are early o¤ers. For T < 1; any late o¤er is made in T.
In conclusion, both types of opportunistic behavior raise the cost to the club of the late
conditional o¤er scheme. The longer the remaining time horizon, the lower the threshold
between early and late admittance, and the lower the level ^ d up to which the late o¤er requires
no rents to the applicant.
4.2.3 Rewarding Entry
Assuming commitment, the stage-…nancing schedule reduces sL to d. The idea is to raise the
gain from not deviating relative to the stepwise reduced cost for the applicant. The ratio of
bene…t to cost of reforming can also be raised if the club requires full reform in one go, but raises
the bene…t of entering. In particular, the club could raise the applicant’s reform incentives by
o¤ering a reward conditional on entry. O¤ering a pure reward p to any successful entrant, the
gain to reforming and entering is ±¼ + ±u(p) while the opportunity cost is u(d): Hence, a
su¢ciently high p can induce any applicant type to reform fully.
However, as in the previous section, this strategy againrelies on the assumption of exogenous
commitment. Since reform is not veri…able, the applicant is not guaranteed entry even if it
reforms. Since it cannot insist on admittance, its outside option ex post is worth zero, which is
less than accepting entry without payment of p and at least receive ¼. (In fact, if the applicant
22were not …nancially constrained, the club could even extract part or all of ¼ as well). Hence,
any prize o¤ered for entry is not renegotiation-proof.18
Note the crucial role of the non-veri…ability of the reform status x: If x was contractible,
not only would a pure reward scheme become a viable alternative to the pure overfunding
scheme, but the club could even use both to construct an even more cost-e¢cient way to
induce full reform. The option of rewarding entry would clearly be a non-trivial addition to
the contracting space, since a comparison of the incentive constraints for the pure overfunding
(±¼+±u(s) ¸ u(s+ d)) and the pure reward scheme (±¼+±u(p) ¸ u(d)) shows that the pure
reward is strictly cheaper for ± su¢ciently close to 1: Furthermore, since both overfunding and
the reward accrue in di¤erent periods, concavity of u(¢) implies that a mixed contract would
be strictly superior to either pure one.19
4.3 Sources of Commitment Power
[PRELIMINARY]
The power of future membership as incentive mechanism depends on the credibility of the
club’s threat to refuse additional funding. In the preceding section, we show that with strong
commitment ability, the club can use stage …nancing to reduce the transfer to poor applicants
to the pure reform cost. In this case, the late o¤er is strictly dominant. In contrast, lacking
any commitment power in the repeated game leads to opportunistic behavior that renders the
late o¤er unpro…table.20 Here, we discuss brie‡y two modi…cations of the basic model that
create exogenous commitment. (In Section 4.1 commitment came from Assumptions 7 and 6.)
Both mechanisms we discuss rely on competition among a pool of applicants.
First, the current membership size may be such that inclusion of all current applicants,
even if reformed, would exceed a limit on pro…table enlargements. Reasons for such a satura-
tion membership level may be convex crowding costs that on the critical margin exceed ±¦R:
18Going back to the applicants that di¤er in both d and w; there is a further way in which commitment problems
prevent the club from making best use of the late o¤er. In the one-period model of Section 3, applicants with
large wealth relative to reform distance had to pay an ’admittance fee’ to the club. In the repeated game, the
club, instead of admitting the reformed applicant, can take the fee and make a new take-it-or-leave-it o¤er next
time, demanding additional payment. This problem is easily overcome by taking the entrance fee only upon
actual entry. Both the payment and actual entry are observable and veri…able, so this contract would not pose
problems.
19With x veri…able, the entrant’s share ¼ of the total (gross) enlargement surplus ¦R+¼ can be interpreted as
re‡ecting relative bargaining power. We have so far assumed that ¼ is either non-veri…able or non-transferable,
and that the club has all bargaining power. An alternative formulation would be to let ¼ + ¦
R be transferable
and give the applicant such bargaining power that it can extract a share ¼
¦R+¼ of ¼+¦R in ex post negotiations.
This alternative setup results in the same incentive structure as before.
20Credible threats in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games have been analyzed (Farrell and Maskin, 1989).
23The club pre…nances at least one more applicants than it could take in. While it is still an
equilibrium for all applicants not to reform, there is now another equilibrium where all reform
and enter if there are su¢ciently many o¤ers. The expectation that other candidates reform
makes reform strictly optimal for any single potential deviant. Alternatively, the club may
have limited resources. Spending all available funds on pre-…nancing current applicants creates
a credible last opportunity for them to reform and pursue the enlargement gain ¼: Interest-
ingly, the club makes all enlargement o¤ers simultaneously, thus making its resource constraint
strictly binding. Bunched entry results as solution to the commitment problem.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the strategic use of the club membership and reform …nance decisions to induce an
applicant to reform. The main result lies in a ’reversed’ admittance order. Advanced applicant
types enter after having reformed, while less advanced types enter early and have their reforms
monitored by the club. All but the most advanced entrants obtain rents that increase with
their reform distance. We also show that the use of future membership bene…ts as an incentive
mechanism ceases to be e¤ective when the club cannot commit to deny refunding in the future.
Crucial for the reversed admittance result is an assumption on the curvature of the applicant’s
utility function that lets the cost of the moral hazard problem under a late o¤er increase faster
in reform distance than the club’s internal monitoring cost. We have discussed alternative
formalizations that are equivalent in creating a tradeo¤ between the leverage of a late o¤er and
the monitoring capability of an early o¤er; if no such assumption is satis…ed, the late o¤er may
be a dominant strategy for any applicant type.
The analysis can be extended in a variety of directions. The club standard may change
over time, or be a choice variable of the club. Information asymmetries between an applicant
and the club concerning the initial reform level or the cost of reforming (or equivalently, the
productivity of any given investment) creates an adverse selection problem. Furthermore, the
club may have the option to invest of its own, a¤ecting the payo¤ matrix of the game. In the
EU enlargement situation, this version of the model could provide insights into the ’widening’
versus ’deepening’ debate, i.e., whether internal EU reform should precede enlargement or not.
Finally, and again motivated by the EU example, heterogeneity of incumbent club members
plays a crucial role in forming the enlargement strategy.
24APPENDIX
A Proof of Lemma 1 (Reform Implementation)





must hold for full reform to be feasible, giving a minimum transfer of sE = d
° ¡ w:
Part (ii): Provided an applicant has accepted a late o¤er, the club minimizes s subject to
w +s ¸ d (FC-L)
and
±¼ +u(w + s¡ d) ¸ u(w +s): (IC-L)
For types
©
(d;w) : d < u¡1 (±¼) and w 2 (0;1)
ª
; the IC-L is slack, given that reform is
feasible. Hence, the minimum incentive compatible transfer is sL = d ¡w:
For types
©
(d;w) : d > u¡1(±¼) and w 2 (0;1)
ª
, s = d ¡ w violates the IC-L. Thus, the















B Proof of Lemma 2 (Acceptance Early)






¼ + u(w + s¡d) ¸ u(w) (IR-E)
Feasibility of reform requires that w + s ¸ d
° (Lemma 1), and the new entrant retains
w+s¡d ¸
1¡°













(Region I), the FC-E binds and sE = d
° ¡ w: In




: Substituting w+s = d
° from the FC–E into the IR-E directly





= u(w) as the equation de…ning the
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IRE ¡ FCE¢
curve. This curve is























25C Proof of Lemma 3 (Acceptance Late)
The club minimizes s subject to
±¼ +u(w + s¡ d) ¸ u(w +s); (IC-L)
±¼ + u(w +s ¡d) ¸ u(w); (IR-L)
and
w +s ¸ d: (FC-L)
From Lemma 1 it follows that for types
©
(d;w) : d < u¡1(±¼) and w 2 (0;1)
ª
(Regions
III and IV ), the IC-L is always slack. By the same reasoning, the IR-L is slack for w < u¡1 (±¼)
(Region III), and sL is determined by the FC-L. Conversely, for w ¸ u¡1 (±¼) (Region IV )
the IR-L determines sL:
Lemma 1 further implies that for types
©
(d;w) : d > u¡1(±¼) and w 2 (0;1)
ª
(Regions I
and II), the IR-L binds for s · 0 (Region II) and the IC-L binds for s > 0 (Region I), while




d = w ¡u¡1[u(w) ¡±¼]: Being the IC-L for s = 0; the
¡
IRL ¡ICL¢
is concave in w. Totally




u0 (w + s¡ d) ¡ u0 (w + s)
u0 (w +s ¡d)
= 1¡
u0 (w + s)





¡u00 (w + s)u0 (w + s¡ d) +u0 (w + s)u00 (w +s¡ d)
u0 (w +s ¡d)
2 :
Hence, d2d
dw2 < 0 if and only if ¡u00 (w +s)u0 (w + s¡ d) < ¡u0 (w + s)u00 (w +s ¡d); which
amounts to assuming DARA.
D Proof of Proposition 1
We …rst compare the cost to the club of making an early and a late o¤er of admittance for any
type, and then analyze the choice between making an o¤er and making no o¤er.
Lemmas 2 and 3 together divide the space of applicant types into …ve regions (Figure 7).
The club chooses between an early and a late o¤er by comparing for each region the respective
transfers.
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Figure 7: Early Versus Late O¤ers
Proof. For the above types, sE = d¡w+u¡1[u(w) ¡¼] from Lemma 2, while sL is either equal
to d¡w+u¡1[u(w) ¡ ±¼] (Region1) or implicitly de…nedby s = d¡w+u¡1[u(w +s) ¡±¼] > 0
(Region 2) from Lemma 3. Since sL > 0 in Region 2 and ±¼ < ¼, the early o¤er is more
pro…table in either case.







; the IR-E is slack. Hence, in the remaining part of
the proof we only need to compare the FC-E with the transfer under the late o¤er.
Lemma 8 (Region 3) For types
©








; sL < sE:
Proof. By Lemmas 2 and 3, sL = d ¡w < d
° ¡w = sE; which follows from ° 2 (0;1):
Lemma 9 (Region 4) For types with d > u¡1(±¼) for w < u¡1(±¼) and types d ¸ w ¡







(1 ¡ °) d
°
i
such that for d < ~ d; sL < sE; and sL ¸ sE for d ¸ ~ d. Moreover, ~ d < dNE.
Proof. For these types, sL as de…ned by s = d ¡ w + u¡1 [u(w + s) ¡±¼] is compared
to d
° ¡ w = sE: Setting sL = sE yields the de…nition of ~ d: Late admittance is cheaper if
d








; which holds for d > ~ d;
while early is (weakly) cheaper otherwise.











increases monotonically in d; and dNE = °¦R: Hence, ~ d < dNE is implied













(1 ¡ °) d
°
i
equals zero for d = 0; that this di¤erence increases monotonically, and that ~ d < dNE. Finally,















and d < w¡u¡1[u(w) ¡±¼]






, sL > sE i¤
d < u¡1[u(w) ¡±¼]
°
1¡°; and sL · sE otherwise.
Proof. For these types, the club compares sE = d
° ¡ w and d ¡ w + u¡1[u(w) ¡±¼] = sL:
Hence, sE < sL if d
°¡w < d¡w+u¡1[u(w) ¡ ±¼]: Rearranging yields d < u¡1[u(w)¡ ±¼]
°
1¡°:
Equating sE and sL de…nes the
¡
FCE ¡IRL¢
curve, d = u¡1[u(w) ¡±¼]
°
1¡°. This curve is






























curves have a unique intersec-


















sL = 0: Hence, at any intersection sE = sL = 0 must hold, and this point also must lie

















: The expression de…ning dJ is identical to that
de…ning ~ d. Thus, existence, uniqueness, and dJ < dNE all follow from Lemma 9. Moreover,
~ d = dJ > u¡1 (±¼) because dJ is unique, and the
¡
IRL ¡ ICL¢
curve is increasing, concave,
and passes above °w at w = u¡1(±¼).





= u(w) is everywhere above









(Point P) to the right of Point J: This completes the comparison
of an early and a late o¤er.
Although full reform is feasible under either enlargement strategy, the cost of providing the
applicant with su¢cient acceptance and reform incentives may exceed the bene…t of reformed
enlargement to the club.
Lemma 12 (No O¤er) Under Assumption 4, a pro…table late admittance o¤er implies a
pro…table early o¤er, but the reverse does not hold.






















increases monotonically in w. Hence, the dNL curve lies everywhere
below the dNE curve.

























































: Since ±¦R > dJ
° ; concavity of u(¢) implies
that this can only hold if dJ < dNL:
E Proof Of Corollary 1
Recall w1 ´ u¡1(±¼); w2 : ±¼ +u[(1 ¡°)w] = u(w); and de…ne w3 ´
1¡°
° dJ: We …rst give a
formal restatement of Corollary 1. The optimal transfer is
(i) s > d for all types:
©



















(ii) 0 < s < d for all types:
©








(d;w) : d 2
¡





(d;w) : d 2
³




















(iii) s · 0 for all types:
f(d;w) : d 2 (0;w);w 2 (0;w1)g; and
©
(d;w) : d 2
¡





f(d;w) : d 2 (0;°w);w 2 (w2;1)g (Region III).
Proof. The s = d line: For dJ > d > u¡1(±¼); the IC-L binds. Substituting s = d in the




u0(w+d) > 0: DARA then implies concavity. For d ¸ dJ; sE = d
° ¡ w: Substituting
s = d yields w =
1¡°











Hence, the two curves meet on the horizontal dJ line. The corresponding w coordinate follows
from w =
1¡°
° dJ ´ w3..
The s = 0 line: For
©








; the transfer is given by
sL = d ¡ w: Hence, the s = 0 line has d = w: For w 2 (w1;w2) the s = 0 line is given by
¡
IRL ¡ICL¢
: For w > w2; the transfer is sE = d
° ¡w; and hence, the s = 0 line is d = °w.
F Proof Of Corollary 2





d° > 0 and ddNE
d± > 0. From Lemma





























































´i > 0: The lower separating line is given by the
¡
FCE ¡IRL¢
29curve, d = u¡1[u(w) ¡±¼]
°
1¡°: It follows immediately that dd
d° = u¡1[u(w) ¡±¼] 1
(1¡°)2 > 0;
dd





´ < 0; and dd












d° = ¡ d
°2 and
d[d¡w+u¡1[u(w)¡¼]]





° ¡w;d ¡ w + u¡1 [u(w) ¡ ¼]
i
weakly decreases in ° and ¼.
As
d(d¡w+u¡1[u(w)¡±¼])
d± = ¡ ¼
u0(w+s¡d);
d(d¡w+u¡1[u(w)¡±¼])
d¼ = ¡ ±
u0(w+s¡d);
d^ s
d± = ¡ ¼
u0(w+s¡d)¡u0(w+s); and d^ s




d ¡w;d ¡w + u¡1 [u(w) ¡±¼];^ s
ª
also weakly decreases in ± and ¼:
G Proof of Lemma 6
The Lemma follows from (3) by noting that by concavity of u; [u(s0) ¡ u(s0 +d)] increases in
s0: Concavity of u(^ st+1) also implies that successive increments in s0 get smaller as T rises.
H Admittance O¤ers Without Reform
In this section we analyze the club’s optimal behavior for non-reform implementing o¤ers.
First, we show that no o¤er strictly dominates a late, non-reform implementing o¤er. Second,
we derive the optimal non-reform implementing early o¤er and identify the set of types that
accept such an o¤er. Third, we show that Assumption 3 implies that the club strictly prefers
no o¤er to a non-reform implementing early o¤er.
Lemma 13 (Never No-Reform Late) Making no o¤er strictly dominates an accepted, non-
reform implementing late o¤er.
Without reform, the club never admits a late applicant as ¦U < 0: Hence, an applicant
accepts a non-reform implementing late o¤er if and only if s ¸ 0; since then u(w +s) > u(w).
Since ¦U ¡s < 0; the club strictly prefers making no o¤er.















; the optimal non-




1¡° ¡w if w ¸ u¡1(¼);
¡w otherwise.
Proof. The condition for an early o¤er that leaves insu¢cient funds for reform is 0 ·
° (w +s) < d: The applicant rejects such an o¤er if and only if ¼ +u[(1 ¡°)(w +s)] < u(w):







, the club minimizes s subject to




> w + s ¸ 0: (FC-EN)
If u(w) < ¼; then the club can extract all the applicant’s wealth, i.e., s = ¡w: Otherwise,
the IR-EN binds.
We now compare admittance without reform with no o¤er.
Lemma 15 (Never No-Reform Early) Given Assumption 3, making no o¤er strictly dom-
inates an accepted, non-reform implementing early o¤er.
Proof. Lemma 14 implies that the club’s payo¤ from a non-reform implementing o¤er is at
most ¦U + u¡1 (¼):
While simple, the condition in Assumption 3 is overly strong, since it would be su¢cient
that no reform is dominated by either no o¤er or reformed entry.
I The Curvature of sL
In general, the curvature of the transfer sL in d is ambiguous. Let 0+0 denote the argument
w + s in u; and no subscript w + s¡ d: Di¤erentiation of ds




































This condition holds for a diminishing coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion, weighted by





where ¸(¢) is the standard coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion. While ¯0 < 0 does not hold for
(negative) exponential or logarithmic utility functions, it holds for instance for u(¢) =
p
¢:
We can show that ¯0 < 0 is generally satis…ed for a subset of DARA-HARA functions.











with ¯ > 0; ° 6= 1;
¯x
1¡° + ´ > 0 and ´ = 1 if ° = ¡1: The coe¢cient of absolute risk


















31Hence, A0 (x) < 0 for ° < 1; which de…nes a subset DARA-HARA of the general HARA






































Hence, a necessary and su¢cient condition for this condition to hold is ° 2 (0;1) under the
restriction to real-valued utility. This de…nes the subclass of DARA-HARA functions for which
the weighted measure of absolute risk aversion is decreasing.
J Proof of Lemma 4















K Proof of Lemma 5
No overfunding implies sa = da for a = 1;:::;A. Feasibility of full reform requires
PA
a=1da ¸ di.
Thus, for all A < A,
PA





. For A > A,
PA
a=1 ^ da > di and an incentive compatible schedule with at
least one stage less exists.
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